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The inhibitors to growth in power sector were many—small and big but the main roadblock
in the growth path was Government Policy, which made it difficult or rather impossible for
a private player to enter. This further aggravated the problem that Indian entrepreneurs
didn’t have enough knowledge and experience in developing power projects. To worsen
the scenario, the SEBs and other Government Agencies became financially weak to propel
any future expansion or growth in the sector.  Electricity Act, 2003 was a major step in
solving the above underlying problems of the power sector. A whole new system was
evolved where private players were invited to be an active participant. The system
demanded financial, political and other infrastructural growth—with major requirement in
roads and communication. Some of the bold steps taken in the Act were moving generation
and distribution out of ‘License Raj’ regime, opening access to national grid and
demolishing the ‘Single Buyer’ model. The failure of the huge federal structure and the
changing global scenario have forced Government to think of ways to revive this
fundamental infrastructure sector. Two of the avenues that government can count on for
future growth of this sector is “Midgets or Small Power Plants” and “CDM—Clean
Development Mechanism”.
© 2004 The ICFAI University Press. All Rights Reserved.
India and Infrastructure
With traditional government controlled vertically integrated monopoly giving way
for new multi-player market-driven scenario, the opportunity in power sector
attracted entrepreneurs into the sector. The ever-growing demand gap asked for
addition of 1000 MW generation capacity per year. These forces coupled gave
rise to different strategies that were new to the sector. One of the fast growing
strategies that attracted a lot of players was—Small Power Plants or ‘Midgets’.
State treasuries were empty and debt was already killing loss making state run
power units. The lack of internally generated funds and the inability of treasuries to
provide funds have resulted in severe shortages of capital for expanding generating
capacity1. Governments (central and state) and utilities hoped to solve these
capital scarcity problems with an influx of private capital. It was also believed that
the indigenous private sector might not have the necessary capital, as the foreign
exchange component of funds required by the power sector could be large.
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The target of keeping the power sector under tight government regime was
to have proper access, equity and distribution of power to various sections of
society. The socialist dream didn’t materialize, the benefits of electricity have not
reached the whole population—a significant fraction of the population (particularly
the rural poor) does not have access to electricity. At the same time, some
consumer categories, not necessarily the poorest, are given subsidized electricity.
Benefits are skewed in favor of certain categories of consumers (e.g., irrigation
pump set owners). Agriculture consumes almost one third of the power in India,
yet provides less than 5% of the revenues.
NIMBY (Not in My Backyard) Syndrome is a major concern in India, which is
unique as far as developing nations are concerned. These concerns are focused
on pollution from coal-based thermal plants, on the various problems of nuclear
plants such as reactor safety, the NIMBY (Not in my backyard!) syndrome, low-level
radiation and disposal of high-level wastes, and on the negative impacts of
hydroelectric plants including the displacement of people, the submergence of
forests and situation. There are also concerns about global warming impacts of
energy production and use.
The hardship of the state controlled power units, due to lack of fresh capital,
environmental concerns and inability of these units to meet the socialist agenda,
forced government to open the floodgates and allow private participation.
A number of policy initiatives have been taken since 1991 for encouraging private
investment in power sector with a view to streamline the procedure and
delegation of power for early implementation of projects.
Mega Power Plants’ high investment requirements is the first major inhibitor.
Non-availability of reliable customer, NIMBY syndrome, political pressure,
technological risk and long development and set-up time are the other causes
that deter entrepreneurs from this option. To add to the fear are the burning
examples of Dabhol, Tehri, Naptah Jakhri and many others.
The negatives of Mega Power Plants lead private players to look for
alternatives and there came in Midgets or Small Power Plants. Midgets are
relatively less capital intensive with added advantage of less political pressure,
small gestation period, less NIMBY hassles and as generation is small we can
have our own tie-ups with individuals, corporations and other parties or
consumers.
Government also favored this concept as it would help to have a distributed
network of plants which would help it to reach larger area and utilize small pools
of energy resources like gas wells, lignite mines and high wind zones. The idea
of Midgets was further propelled with the latest technological advancements in
the areas of small engine and turbine technology.51 Analysis of Power Sector in India: A Structural Perspective
All the above logic and citations clearly lead us to the fact that Indian Power
Sector is going under a major revamp of ideology. The paradigm of ‘Goliaths’ has
started withering and ‘Midgets’ are gaining ground. The future looks promising
and full of light.
India Shining
“In the past our growth rates of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) have been such
as to double our per capita income over a period of nearly 20 years. The changing
world scenario—political, economic, social and cultural has proven to all of us that
such a growth rate will reduce India’s stature in the world and put it in the
receiving end of the game.”2
Reacting to the above fears and recognizing the importance of making a
quantum jump compared with past performance, Planning Commission started
examining the feasibility of doubling per capita in the next ten years and stated
that “with population expected to grow at about 1.6% per annum, the target
requires the rate of growth of GDP to be around 8.7% over the Tenth (2002-2007)
and Eleventh Plan (2007-2012)”.
The approach paper to the Tenth Plan admits that 8 to 9% annual growth
target for the next ten years is technically feasible, but, that it could not be
achieved through a “business as usual” approach—‘Radical Changes’ are
necessary. “The principal reason why 8% growth may be feasible in the Tenth Plan
is that the scope for bringing about improvements in efficiency is very large, both
in the public sector and in the private sector”3
Infrastructure—The Growth Imperative
The basic requirement and detrimental factor for growth and success of all
companies—industrial or service—is Infrastructure. The infrastructural sectors—
transport, power and telecommunication—have direct bearing on the improvements
of all production companies. Industrial output growth in India has closely tracked
the movements in the composite index of infrastructure industries during 1980s
and 1990s [Figure 1]. This observed relationship between infrastructure growth
and industrial performance has important implications for sustaining higher output
growth.
The decline of infrastructural growth between 1980s and 1990s was mainly
from the decline in growth of electricity, coal and petroleum—essentially the
energy sub-sectors. Thus, identification and bridging of the sectoral infrastructure
gaps assumes critical importance for sustained high economic growth.4
2 As stated in ‘Reliance Review of Energy Markets’ in reference to existing Indian Growth Scenario.
3 Statement by Planning Commission in Tenth Plan (2002-2007).
4 As inferred in 10th Plan Approach Paper, Planning Commission.The Icfaian Journal of Management Research, November 2004 52
Power Sector in India
Introduction and Overview
Among the important sectors—transport, power and telecommunication—power
sector has shown significant and sustained gaps for long. The poor performance
of SEBs, with increasing financial strain emanating from low average tariffs and
high cross subsidies to agriculture and household sectors have stifled the growth
of this sector.
According to Tenth Plan approach paper, “The energy infrastructure will be
major constraint on any effort to achieve a significant acceleration on the growth
of GDP in Tenth Plan period … This will place heavy demands on the generation
and distribution of electric power. Furthermore, in globally competitive
environment, the quality of these services in terms of both price and reliability
are as important as availability and it is well-known that we face serious problems
on both counts.”
But fundamental issues—such as frequent power cuts, both scheduled and
unscheduled, erratic voltage and low or high supply frequency have added to ‘power
woes’ of the consumers5. The Indian Power industry has since independence faced
the demand and supply gap [Figure 2]. The said gap is still prevalent even after
government initiated the reform process in early nineties. The graph below shows
the current region-wise deficit.
Roadblock to Power Sector Development
Some of the factors responsible for present situation are as under:
• Lack of focus and absence of a clear-cut policy (e.g. Government of India’s initial
attempt at promoting projects based on liquid fuel like naphtha which turned
nonviable, mega projects which could not take shape etc.).
5 http://www.worldenergy.org/wec-geis/news_events/member_news/comm_power.asp
Figure 1: Industry and Infrastructure Growth Relationship
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• Lack of exposure of Indian entrepreneurs to the Indian power sector, which
limited their perspective on developing and operating power projects.
• Inexperience of SEBs in operating in the changed market environment and
their poor financial health, which limited their escrow capacity.
• Unavailability of fuel and unwillingness of fuel suppliers to enter into bankable
contracts.
• Lack of necessary infrastructure to transport and store fuel and high cost risk
involved in transporting fuel.
• Limited financial capability of the promoters to bring equity.
• Weak financial condition of SEBs was the biggest roadblock for sector’s
development. [Figure 3]
Due to un-remunerative tariffs and irregular payment of subsidies by state
governments, SEBs have not been able to invest in capacity additions and system
upgradation. Also SEBs have not been able to make full payments for the
purchases, and therefore their creditworthiness is questionable.
The Government has realized the importance of power in the economic
development of the country. The Union Ministry of Power has developed
appropriate strategies and a blueprint to address the problems in a time-bound
manner. These strategies and the blueprints are flexible and can be adjusted to
accommodate positive inputs and developments.6
6 As stated in Blueprint for Power Sector Development, 1991, by Ministry of Power.
Figure 2: Demand Supply Gap of Electricity in India
Year-wise Peak Demand and Peak Met in India (1996-97 to 2002-03)
(In Million Units)
Year Peak Demand Peak Met Shortage Shortage
1996-97 63853 52376 11477 18.0%
1997-98 65435 58042 7393 11.3%
1998-99 67905 58445 9460 13.9%
1999-00 72669 63691 8978 12.4%
2000-01 78037 67880 10157 13.0%
2001-02 78441 69189 9252 11.8%
2002-03 81492 71520 9972 12.2%
(April 2002-
January 2003)
Source : Annual Report 2002-03, Ministry of Power and Past Issue, Government of IndiaThe Icfaian Journal of Management Research, November 2004 54
In line with the above strategies and to offer a much needed momentum to
the sector, Government of India, introduced Electricity Act, 2003 (hereinafter
referred to as the “Act”). The Act is expected to act as a strong business driver
by not only ushering in competition in the power sector but also inducing structural
changes. Its provisions can create new business opportunities as well as build
new capabilities within the existing business organizations.
Electricity Act, 2003—The Booster
The ‘Act’ provides for:
(a)Generation of electricity is free from licensing,
Impact7: More industries will be encouraged to setup captive power plants.
Also, the time required for setting up a power plant—from the proposal to the
completion stage—will be shortened considerably.
(b)Captive generation freely permitted, for both or a one-to-one basis, as small
as or a group captive basis.
Impact: Captive Power Plants (CPPs) will be allowed to use power not only
for captive use but also to sell to other licensees. This will allow captive
generators to sell excess power at more remunerative prices than before, and
thus raise the capacity utilization to existing plants and also encourage new
capacity addition.
(c) Open access for captive use on payment of wheeling charges.
Impact:  This will allow open access to transmission lines, thus allowing them
to bypass the SEBs and sell power directly to the distribution and trading
licensees.
7 As discussed and understood by us during our discussion with various officials of KSK.
Figure 3: Financial and Operating Performance of State Electricity Boards
Fiscal Rate of Grossa Cost of Average Agriculture Cost T&D
Year Return Subsidy Supply Tariff Tariff Recovery Losses
(%) (Rs. Billion) (Paise/kWh) (Paise/kWh) (Paise/kWh) (%) (%)
1994 -12.3 111 149.1 116.7 17.9 78.3 20.2
1995 -13.1 135 163.4 128.0 18.8 78.3 21.1
1996 -16.4 168 179.6 139.0 19.0 77.4 22.3
1997 -19.6 200 215.6 165.3 21.2 76.7 24.5
1998 -22.9 243 239.7 180.3 20.2 75.2 24.8
1999 -34.2 288 263.1 186.8 21.0 71.0 26.5
2000 -43.1 328 305.1 207.0 22.6 67.8 30.8
2001 -39.1 370 327.2 226.3 35.4 69.2 29.9
2002 -44.1 427 349.9 239.9 41.5 68.6 27.8
T & D = Transmission and distribution.
a Subsidy to agriculture and residential customers.
Source: Annual Report on Working of State Electricity Boards and Electricity Departments.
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(d)Consumers would have a right for non-discriminatory open access to
transmission/distribution network subject to payment of surcharges to meet
current level of cross subsidy as well as the applicable wheeling charges.
Impact: With this freedom to buy and sell power, initially in the wholesale
market and eventually in the retail market, the end-user will benefit both in
terms of choice of supplier and reliability of supply.
(e)Stand alone Generation/Distribution of Electricity for Rural areas Permitted.
Impact:  This will allow potential private entrants to enter the distribution
business, while putting pressure on incumbents to enhance performance and
customer service.
(f) Mandatory purchase of power from renewable sources by the distribution
licensee.
(g)Single Buyer model is completely abolished.
Impact: This will bring competition in the industry. Competition among players
will also enhance efficiency and led to better customer service standards.
The Sector Setup
The organization of power sector is determined by the country’s federal structure.
In India, the subject of electricity is covered under the Concurrent List in the
Constitution of India, implying that both the central government and state
governments have the power to make legislation for the sector. As a result, all
major issues affecting the power sector require concurrent action by the central
government and state governments.
The Government’s Ministry of Power provides overall guidance to the sector
through the Central Electricity Authority. The recently established Central
Electricity Regulatory Commission is empowered to regulate the central power
utilities in accordance with the Electricity Regulatory Commission Act, 1998. The
central power utilities include the National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC),
the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC), and the Nuclear Power
Corporation (NPC), which are engaged in generation, and the Powergrid
Corporation, which is engaged in interstate power transmission. The Government
also owns financing institutions devoted solely to power sector lending such as
the Power Finance Corporation Limited (PFCL) and the Rural Electrification
Corporation. Recently, the Government established the Power Trading
Corporation (PTC), to be responsible for power trading among states and
between states and central power utilities.8 At the State level we have SEBs and
EDs responsible for their respective jurisdiction areas’ power generation,
transmission and distribution. (See Box 1)
8 As described in the official website of Ministry of Power, Government of India, at www.powermin.nic.inThe Icfaian Journal of Management Research, November 2004 56
The existence of huge demand supply gap clearly indicates the inefficiency of
the mammoth organizational setup of the Indian Power Sector [Figure 4]. On
critical analysis of the setup, we found that the inefficiency is caused as most
of them have overlapping functions. The involvement of State Government in this
sector has further complicated the issue, each state has developed its own
electricity policy and pricing based on its own interest rather than thinking of
country as a whole. The different pricing regimes and distribution policies of state
governments further aggravated the power situation.
The failure of the huge federal structure and the changing global scenarios
have forced Government to think of ways to revive this fundamental infrastructure
sector. Two of the avenues that government can count on for future growth of
this sector are “Midgets or Small Power Plants” and “CDM—Clean Development
Mechanism”.
The Rise of Midgets in the Indian Power Sector
For the major part of the previous century, the traditional school of thought
considered power generation, transmission and distribution as a natural
monopoly. Electricity was viewed as a national strategic asset and hence, best
provided by a vertically integrated monopoly, usually owned and directly
controlled by the state. Even in cases where the monopoly providers were private
players (as in the US), the state still maintained tight control through heavy-handed
regulatory policies and measures.
Monopoly and state control of the sector became highly questionable around
the globe in the last two decades. Cry for reduction of government participation
and interference in industry coupled with fiscal deficit forced in a strategic
reshaping of the sector [Figure 5]. The forerunner of the race was Chile followed
by Argentina. The real momentum making this restructuring a global phenomenon
was given by UK when it embarked on its ambitious privatization reforms. The
wave since then has swept countries like US, Japan, Norway, Netherlands,
Canada, France and Australia. This paper aims at studying the effect of the wave
in the context of India.
Box 1: The Organization of Power Sector in India
At the state level, the state governments control the sector through 21 State
Electricity Boards (SEBs) and 14 Electricity Departments (EDs). These SEBs and
EDs are responsible for generation, transmission, and distribution, usually
within their own states and territories. The central power utilities own and
operate 30% of the country’s total generation capacity, while SEBs and EDs
have 59% of the total. In addition, five privately owned utilities, operating in
certain urban centers and responsible for power distribution within their
franchised areas, and some independent power producers have a share of 11%
of the generation.
Source: Reliance Review of Energy Markets, 200357 Analysis of Power Sector in India: A Structural Perspective


















































BPCL: Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd
BEF: Bureau of Energy Efficiency
BRPL: Bangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals Ltd
CEA: Central Electricity Authority
CERC: Central Electricity Regulatory Commission
CIL: Coal India Limited
CRL: Cochin Refineries Ltd
DAE: Department of Atomic Energy
GAIL:  Gas Authority of India Ltd
HPCL: Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd
IOC: Indian Oil Corporation Ltd
IREDA: India Renewable Energy Development Agency
IBP: Indo-Burma Petroleum Company Ltd
MRL: Madras Refineries Ltd
MRPL: Mangalore Refinery and Petrochemicals
        Ltd
MNES: Ministry of Non-conventional Energy
        Sources
NHPC: National Hydro-electric Power Corporation
NLC: Neyveli Lignite Corporation
NPTI: National Power Training Institute
NTPC: National Thermal Power Corporation
OCC: Oil Coordination Committee
OIL: Oil India Limited
ONGC: Oil and Natural Gas Corporation
PCIL: Powergrid Corporation of India Ltd
PFC: Power Finance Corporation
PTCI:  Power Trading Corporation of India Ltd
REC: Rural Electrification CorporationThe Icfaian Journal of Management Research, November 2004 58
Electricity consumption in India has more than doubled in the last decade,
outpacing economic growth. The primary energy supply in the country is
coal-dominant with the power sector accounting for about 40% of primary energy
and 70% of coal consumption. It is also the single largest consumer of capital,
drawing over one-sixth of all the Indian investments over the past decade9.
Fuelled by high coal and investment consumption, India’s power sector has
grown 80-fold since independence to over 107,000 MW but the per capita power
consumption is very low, approximately 350 kWh/year [Tongia,2004]. This number
is not precisely known, since a significant fraction of the consumption is
unmetered, and there is a large proportion of theft. Ostensibly, transmission and
distribution (T&D) losses are about 25% [Figure 6], but only some fraction of the
losses are technical losses; the theft is bundled together as “commercial losses.”
The fundamentals are very poor—with every kWh sold, the utilities lose over 1.1
rupees10 on average. This results in enormous losses for the utilities and the
government, despite billions of rupees in explicit and implicit subsidy. One major
reason for the system’s non-viability is the skewed retail tariffs, whereby
agricultural consumers receive virtually free power (with flat-rate pricing
averaging under 0.50 Rs/kWh) and even domestic consumers receive modest
subsidies. Together, these are about half the consumption. The remaining paying
customers (primarily commercial and industrial) cross-subsidize these sectors
through very high tariffs. Worse, industry cannot rely on the grid for power supply.
9 http://www.pewclimate.org/global-warming-in-depth/all_reports/india/pol_india_execsumm.cfm
10 Planning Commission 2002, Annual Report on the Working of SEB and Electricity Department.
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The above state of the Indian Power Sector can be viewed both as a crisis
and as an opportunity. It is a crisis for the government controlled electricity
generation, transmission and distribution companies, for they have to do
something fast to improve their financial health. The opportunity lies in the hands
of private entrepreneurs who can venture in any of the three avenues, but the
question that troubled most of the aspiring industrialists was and is—Will the
government open the gates? If Yes, when and how much?
Reasons for Change
For over 15 years, Indian electricity boards (as India’s utilities are called) have
been trapped in the crises of capital, access/equity/distribution, environment and
performance [Reddy, 1993].
Severe financial losses have led to the almost total inability of these utilities
to self-finance improvements. Utilities also borrowed heavily and aggravated their
losses. In the past, these losses used to be made good by government
treasuries, but now, most treasuries are ‘‘empty’’. The lack of internally generated
funds and the inability of treasuries to provide funds have resulted in severe
shortages of capital for expanding generating capacity. Governments (central and
state) and utilities hoped to solve these capital scarcity problems with an influx
of private capital [Reddy and D’Sa, 1995]. It was also believed that the indigenous
When not suffering from hours of blackouts or burnouts, the supplied power is
of very poor quality, with voltage and frequency deviating well beyond the norms
of 6% and 3% deviation, respectively [Tongia, 2004]. To add to the above problem
is the widening demand supply gap. Official estimates of Ministry of Power placed
the energy shortage at 12.2% in 2003.
 Figure 6: Electricity Losses
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private sector might not have the necessary capital, as the foreign exchange11
component of funds required by the power sector could be large.
The target of keeping the power sector under tight government regime was
to have proper access, equity and distribution of power to various sections of
society. The socialist dream didn’t materialize, the benefits of electricity have not
reached the whole population—a significant fraction of the population (particularly
the rural poor) does not have access to electricity. At the same time, some
consumer categories, not necessarily the poorest, are given subsidized electricity.
Benefits are skewed in favor of certain categories of consumers (e.g., irrigation
pump set owners) [Figures 7 and 8]. Agriculture consumes almost one third of
the power in India, yet provides less than 5% of the revenues. [Tongia, 2003].
11 The foreign exchange is mostly required for purchasing electricity generation equipments.
In spite of the well-known common fact that electricity supply is less than
demand, Indian public shows a high degree of concern for environment, which
is unique as far as developing nations are concerned. These concerns are focused
on pollution from coal-based thermal plants (particulates, acid rain, etc.), on the
various problems of nuclear plants such as reactor safety, the NIMBY (Not in my
backyard!) syndrome, low-level radiation and disposal of high-level wastes, and
on the negative impacts of hydroelectric plants including the displacement of
people, the submergence of forests and siltation  [Reddy 2001]. There are also
concerns about global warming impacts of energy production and use.







Traction (Railways) 7.19 2.28
Outside the state 3.91 1.24
Others 32.71 10.39
Total 314.83 100.00
Source: Planning Commission, Annual Report 2001-02
Figure 8: Key Sectoral Consumption Trend
1950 1970 1974-75 1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01
Share of Out of total
Industry Consumption 62.6 70.8 65.8 61.7 59.1 50.1 38 30.5
Share of Out of total
Agriculture consumption 3.9 9.2 13.3 16.1 17.5 23.9 30.9 29.5
Source: Calculated from Ministry of Power and Planning Commission Data61 Analysis of Power Sector in India: A Structural Perspective
The hardship of the state controlled power units, due to lack of fresh capital,
environmental concerns and inability of these units to meet the socialist agenda, was
further aggravated because of their declining technical performance [Figures 9 and
10]. All this and the growing trend of liberalization in the country caused a shift
in the stand of the government.
 Figure 9: Financial Status of SEBs / Utilities
1991-92 1996-97 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03
(Rs billion)
1 Gross Subsidy to specific sectors:
a. Agriculture 59.38 156.28 240.74 255.70 269.59
b. Domestic (households) 13.10 42.34 99.68 108.94 116.51
c. Inter-State Sales 2.01 2.85 3.86 2.47 2.26
2 Total Gross Subsidy 74.49 201.47 344.28 367.13 388.36
3 Subventions recd. From State Govt. 20.45 62.84 88.20 100.99 79.81
4 Net Subsidy 54.04 138.63 256.07 266.13 308.55
5 Surplus from sales to other sectors 21.73 78.49 34.35 36.15 74.99
6 Uncovered Subsidy 32.31 60.14 221.72 229.99 233.56
7 Commercial losses
a (excluding subventions) 41.17 94.53 253.95 273.06 243.21
b (including subventions)          N.A.     N.A. 165.75 172.07 163.40
8 Rate of Return (RoR) on Net Asset -12.70% -17.20% -41.80% -39.50% -32.10%
Source: Ministry of Finance, 2002



























































































































































































































































Average Cost of Supply
Average Tariff
% Recovery through tariff
Source: Data from the Indian Planning Commission; revised estimates are used for 2000-2001.
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The electricity needs were enormous. Government’s perspective plan for the
power sector indicated that there would an incremental capacity requirement of
142000 MW during the period 1992-2007 to meet the demand over this period.
That would imply creation of an incremental capacity of nearly 10000 to 12000
MW per year12. This mammoth task and the decreasing health of the State
finances13 forced government to invite private participation in the power sector.
The private participation was invited in all the three parts of the sector –
generation, transmission and distribution. A number of policy initiatives have been
taken since 1991 for encouraging private investment in power sector with a view
to streamline the procedure and delegation of power for early implementation
of projects.
‘Goliaths’ Lose Faith
The reform government, Narasimha Rao’s Congress led Government, awarded
“fast track” status to eight mega14 projects (many with foreign participation),
promising rapid clearances and central government repayment guarantees—which
were never offered again [Tongia 2003]. Of the above eight projects only three15
have produced power to date—more than a decade after the fast track initiative.
Two of these projects—one built by GVK Industries and the other by Enron—both
of which have faced and still facing a lot of problems.
Mega Power Plants invariably need to have a Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)
with any of the State Electricity Boards (SEBs) or transmission and distribution
company in advance to mitigate the risk of the high investment. This PPA being
for longer periods (20 to 30 years) are subjected to various post signing problems.
As for Enron, they were affected by change of government. A new Shiv Sena
government elected in 1995 in Maharasthra filed suit to cancel the PPA on grounds
of corruption and fraud. SEBs are also financially weak because of their past and
hence, their payment of dues timely is also questionable.
Like Enron, GVK also had its brush with a public utility company. Its Jegurupadu
power plant was supposed to run at a maximum theoretical efficiency of 68.5%
but at present is running at 85%, thus reducing per unit cost substantially and
increasing profitability [Tongia 2001]. The PPA rate was based on the theoretical
efficiency and hence, the plant has been under a continuous legal battle with
Government of Andhra Pradesh, which demands a reduction of the rate at which
it purchases power from the plant.
NIMBY syndrome is another major concern in establishing a mega project. The
projects are difficult to initiate and complete because of high local resistance.
Concern for environment, loss of land and high expectations (employment, health
benefits etc.) are some of the many things that are to be taken care of.
12 As stated in Ministry of Power’s Report titled “India’s Electricity Sector—Widening Scope for Private
Participation” published in 1991.
13 The States’ Balance from Current Revenue had deteriorated continuously, declining from Rs. 3118 cr in 1985-86
to Rs. 220 cr in 1992-93 after which it turned negative and reached the massive figure of minus Rs. 32306 cr
in the year 2000-01 [Source: Reliance Review of Energy Markets, 2003].
14 Mega Project refers to 100 MW and above capacity projects.
15 The third project is the smallest of the three—Spectrum Power’s 208 MW gas-based Kakinada Project, located
in Andhra Pradesh and commissioned in January 1998.63 Analysis of Power Sector in India: A Structural Perspective
Tehri Hydel Power Plant (1000 MW), a government owned and initiated project
is all stagnant at an advance stage of construction because of the syndrome.
To add to the plight of the promising hydel power sector of India was Naptha Jhakri
case. Naptha Jhakri Hydel Power Plant of 1500 MW was the most prominent
recipients of official funding in India’s power sector and which exemplifies many
of the serious problems of large dams [Bosshard, 2002]. “As far as mega
hydroelectric projects are concerned, words like ‘tomorrow’ are just not
applicable,” The Tribune of Chandigarh (December 21, 2001) editorialized after the
World Bank announced closure of its loan for the project from March 2002 on the
grounds of cost and time overrun of the project. Faulty design, environmental
unconcern and wide scale corruption lead to revision of completion date from July
2000 to July 2004 and project cost from 16 to 100 bn rupees [Bosshard, 2002].
In recent past, we haven’t seen initialization of any Mega Power Plant by the
private sector.16 Government interference and NIMBY Syndrome can be cited as
the two main reasons. These two problems were further augmented with smaller
problems like clearances, finance, corruption and long gestation period. This
forced aspirants who want to benefit in power sector boom to look for newer
business ideas that could mitigate the above problems to maximum extent. One
of the many strategies that rightly solves this problem is Development of Small
Power Plants—‘Midgets’.
Rise of ‘Midgets’
Energy Resource Map of India [Figure 11] clearly shows that Southern and
Western are equally rich in energy resources as the North and East part, but on
seeing the Power Deficit Map [Figure 12] we see that Southern and Western parts
are relatively more power deficit than the rest of India. On further examination
of Resource Map, it was observed that in other parts of India, the resources are
concentrated and available in large quantity while in Southern and Western it
is distributed and less in quantity, specially oil and gas. The availability of fuel
resources in the form of isolated gas wells, biomass, canal drops and run of the
river hydro sources, to name a few, present a lucrative opportunity to be exploited
through projects of small sizes.
The idea of small power plant was subdued in the past because of
unavailability of proper technology that could use these resources efficiently.
Recent technological advancement, in areas like small capacity engines and micro
turbines, has fuelled rapid growth in this area.
Faced with unreliable power supply, many industries have invested in on-site
power generation, which as per CMIE estimates now accounts for more than 10%
of total capacity. This ratio is likely to increase as the Electricity Bill, 2001
eliminated the need for license for power generation and allows power trading.
Due to this deregulation, many industries will put up power plants for their
individual usage. Such plants will predominantly be midgets.
Small power plants are simpler in technology and construction as in comparison
to a large power plant. This simplicity of the plant reduces a lot to development
complexities, which in turn reduces the project execution time. Small power plants
can be setup in a time span of 9 to 12 months and require less investment. Thus,
it can be stated as a low investment and fast return opportunity. Smaller gestation
16 Reliance has announced Hirma 3690 MW plant in Orissa and proposed a 1000 MW plant in Uttar Pradesh.
Both of these projects are still to clear and are in the pre-financial closure stage.The Icfaian Journal of Management Research, November 2004 64
Figure 11: Energy Resource Map of India







Figure 12: Power Deficit Map of India
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period and small size makes Midget as a potent tool for distributed capacity
development. With same capital and other resources as a central large power
plant, we can develop many smaller power plants distributed over a larger area.
The payback period in Midgets would be smaller than in Goliaths and the capacity
developed being distributed will give a more reliable and steady power grid.
Due to less complexity, the clearances required in smaller plants are also less
and can be obtained much faster than for a large project. Large projects have
larger concerns, so have to deal with both Central and State Government but
for smaller ones State Government is maximum level. Thus, Midgets not only enjoy
a faster and smaller execution time but also a simpler and shorter inception and
development phase.
 A large part of India has still not seen the magic of electricity as the power
cannot be distributed to those areas due to terrain and distance problems. A
large part of these places are in the Himalayan Ranges or in the Tropical Forests
of South India. The solution to this problem is also development of Midget.
Installation of small capacity power plants, based on non-conventional
technologies like wind, solar, biomass, tidal or a combination of these, would be
able to bring light in these areas of the country. Such projects would require active
government participation and assistance.
The risk in Midgets has been mitigated as compared to Goliaths and so,
following the Risk-Return Concept, the return on Midgets is also less. The
economies of scale and ease of control is lost in Midgets. This increases per unit
cost of electricity in comparison to Goliaths.
The cost of transportation of electricity from plant to usage point per unit would
be more as the electric design of the evacuation system depends mostly on
Voltage rather than units transmitted. Thus, evacuation cost per unit is more for
Midget than Goliaths.
Conclusion
Energy privatization has been part and parcel of a recent trend, which has placed
greater reliance on market forces and less dependence on government in the
allocation of resources. Although India is just at the beginning of the energy
reforms, we sense the opportunities that can enable us to leapfrog into new
scales of development process.
The growing demand-supply gaps, ill health of state run units and
technological advancement, along with government willingness to relinquish its
control, heralded the incoming of private investors into the sector in a big way.
The initial experience with large power plants gave soar taste to many due to
many different reasons and hence, the idea of ‘Midgets’ rose to its pinnacle.
Midgets provide a major growth opportunity for the investor. They can be a
huge help in reaching the development goal of ‘Electricity to Everyone’. They can
be used to harness the most out of even the smallest of the energy reserves
available. And being small they hardly pose any major environmental threat.
All the above logic and citations clearly lead us to the fact that Indian Power
Sector is going under a major revamp of ideology. The paradigm of ‘Goliaths’ has
started withering and ‘Midgets’ are gaining ground. The future looks promising
and full of Light.